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8OCIAL security benefits for retired workers, their
dependents and their survivors are indexed or linked to
movements in the consumer price index (CPI).’ Price
indexing, a method of making adjustments to inflation,
is the linking of nominal (dollar) magnitudes, such as
wages, interest rates, government expenditures or
taxes, to movements in a price measure. The purpose
of indexing is to ensure that the purchasing power
over goods and services is not changed by movements
in the general level of prices.2 Under current law,
social security payments are automatically increased
in June “whenever the CPI in the first quarter of the
calendar year exceeds the CPI in the first quarter of
the previous calendar year by at least 3 percent.’°
‘The price index specified in legislation is the consumer price
index for urban wage earners and clerical workers rather than
the more recently constructed and more broadly based series
for all urban workers.
2
For background infonnation on indexing, see Thomas NI.
Humphrey, “The Concept of Indexation in the History of Eco-
nomic Thought,” Economic Review (Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, November/December 1974), pp. 3-16; herbert
Giersch, Milton Friedman, et al., Essays on Jriflot,on and
Indexation (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute
for Public Policy Research, 1972); and Jai-Hoon Yang, “The
Case For arid Against Indexation: An Attempt at Perspective,”





~An Analysis of the Effects of Indexing for Inflation on Fed-
eral Expenditures, Report to the Congress of the United States
by the Comptroller General (GAO, August 15, 1979), p. 18.
The current provision for the automatic indexing of social
security benefits was contained in social security- legislation
enacted in 1973. Initially, however, automatic indexing of
benefits was included in the social security legislation enacted
in 1972. The first effective date was to have been January 1,
1975, based on increases in the CPI from the third quarter
of 1972 to the second quarter of 1974, In subsequent years,
possible benefit increases were to be based on second-quarter-
to-second-quarter changes in the CPI and made effective Jan-
uary 1. Legislation enacted in 1973 amended these provisions
by providing the first possible automatic increase in benefits
to he effective in June 1975, based on the change in CPI
from the second quarter of 1974 to the first quarter of 1975.
For example, effective June 1, 1981, social security
payments were increased 11.2 percent, reflecting the
increase in the consumer price index from the first
quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of l981.~
Social security programs are funded by a tax on
wage and salary income.0 Currently, benefits for re-
tired workers, their dependents and survivors, are
rising faster than revenues into the Old Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund from which
these benefits are paid. According to estimates by the
trustees of the social security system°and the Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO), the OASI trust fund
will, face a financing problem beginning in late 1981
or early 1982 that will continue through the decade,7
CBO estimates show that out]ays from the OASI trust
fund in fiscal year 1981 will exceed income into the
fund by $4.8 billion. Furthermore, estimates are that
the trust fund balance will he depleted by the end of
fiscal year 1983, and that the fund will be approxi-
rnately $64 billion in deficit by the end of 1986
(table 1).
4
lnereases are effective June 1 and are payable Jidy 1.
O5ocial security benefits are provided under three separate
programs. The Old Age and Survivors Insurance program,
the largest, with expenditures of 887.6 billion in 1979, pays
benefits to retired workers, their dependents and survivors.
The Disability Insurance program pays benefits to disahled
workers and their dependents, and the Hospital Insurance
program pays benefits to workers covered by the previous
two programs and the railroad retirement progmm.
OThe trustees include the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secre-
tary of Labor, and the Secretary of Health and Human
Services.
~19SO Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal
Old—Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
Trust Funds, H, Doe. 96-332, 96th Congress, 2nd session
(GPO, 1980), p. 50; and Paying for Social Security: Funding
Options for the Near Term, Congressional Budget Office of
the Congress of the United States (February 1981), p. 13.
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This short-term financing problem will begin to
dissipate in the next decade but only because of
sizable increases in payroll taxes scheduled as a re-
sult of the 1977 amendments to the Social Security
Act. In the next century, however, an imbalance again
will emerge between promised social security bene-
fits and projected revenues. The solution to this prob-
lem will require either larger increases in taxes than
those already scheduled or a reduction in promised
benefits.
This article examines the role that the price index-
ing of benefits has played in creating these financing
problems, particularly in the short term. The article
shows that the use of the CPI for indexing probably
has overstated the benefit increases necessary to keep
the purchasing power of benefits constant, and that
price indexing is inconsistent with the way benefits
are funded. In addition, it discusses modifications of
indexing formulas that would help eliminate the cur-
rent imbalance or avert the development of future
financial imbalances.
Over time, the price level varies as the stock of
money changes relative to the available amount of
goods and services. Price indexing first came about to
rectify the fact that prices or incomes administered
by government agencies or fixedby private contractual
agreements, such as wage contracts or fixed payment
mortgage contracts, do not adjust rapidly to changes
in the price level. Market-determined prices of goods
and services eventually will adjust to changes in the
price level. However, social security benefits and pay-
ments under other government programs, which are
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Table 1
Outlays, Income and Balances for the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund
(billions of dollars)
Actual Pro,ections-
1970 1975 1960 1981 1932 1933 1984 1965 1986
Outlays $27.3 $56.7 $103.2 $122.6 $141.4 $158.7 $178.0 8199.3 $222.6
Income 31.7 58.8 100.1 117.8 129.0 143.0 159.1 181.9 203.7
Year-end ba ance ~1iscaI year) 32.6 399 24.6 19.7 7.4 -8.2 27.1 44.5 63.5
‘Social Sic’ ,rth Bnlletcn Api.! 951 ‘. p. 13
loin, II, mnci,1¼iln)i fiji/n, (‘ii , , /, \ if a — tnall,t _UOIcc iii tLN it iitln tue i
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The Rationale for Price Indexing
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Table 3
Alternative Measures of Changes in the Price Level
Consumer price index
Experirricntal Official Personal
rcntul series minus consumption Official CR1
Official equivalence e~per,men’al expenditures minus P~E
Perioe series~ series seriea detcator deflator
1947-77 3.4% n.e. n.e. 3.3% 0.1%
1977 6.6 6.2% 0.4% 5.9 0.7
1978 9.0 7.8 1.2 7.5 1.5
1979 12.7 10.6 2.1 9.5 3.2
1980 12.5 10.8 1.7 10.1 2.4
a,’, Lilt- Ii, il lioirlh Ilulmic’, Ii, Ioi.rih cpwitc’r i ‘u’pt fl,’ 191777 pt’i,tii! ~. Lii.
‘~‘iiipl tact lru’ i’ ‘ccli’ a’ trace d::t’i.
All cr1
,:, ii ‘~l jrkei’’.c’Hi
not directly determined by market forces, must some-
how be adjusted to changes in the price level if
Congress desires to offset the impact of these changes
on the payments’ purchasing power.
On a practical level, an advantage of price indexing
is that it is automatic, so it relieves Congress from
having to devote considerable attention to frequent
increases in benefits in an inflationary environment.
Also, given the tendency of Congress in the late l960s
and early 1970s to increase benefits faster than the
price level (table 2), indexing may have acted to
put a cap on benefit increases, and thus may have
averted an even larger financing crisis. Nevertheless,
there are problems with the price indexing of benefits
that should be discussed.
The Vexing Problem of Measuring Changes
in the Price Level
Price indexation requires a statistical measure of the
price level, which in practice, is measured by price
indexes. Typically, a price index is designed to answer
the question, “Ho\v much does the cost of a basket
of goods and services change over time?” Unfortu-
nately, there are numerous technical problems in pro-
viding an answer.8
5
For a more thorough discussion of the problems in measuring
the pnce level, see William H. \Vallace aad William E.
Cnllison, Measuring Price Changes: A Study of the Price
Indexes, 4th ed. (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1979);
and R.G.D. Allen. “Index Numbers in Theory and Practice”
(Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1975).
Two widely used price indexes — the consumer
price index and the personal consumptiou expendi-
tures (PCE) deflator — demonstrate the differences
that can arise between price measures. Though these
indexes have followed similar patterns in the past,
their movements diverged substantially in 1979 and
1980 (see table 3). For example, the CPI increased
3.2 percentage points more than the PCE deflator in
1979 and 1.7 percentage points more in 1980. While
there are several differences in the way these two
price indexes are computed, two of the more signifi-
cant differences are the choice of period in which to
define the market basket — either current or past —
and the methods used to measure housing costs.
Fixed Versus Variable Weights — The CPI-W,
which is used to index social security benefits, is
a “fixed-weight” index. The procedure for calculat-
ing this index is to regularly survey prices of a
large number of items consumers typically purchase
(the so-called market basket) and compare the aggre-
gate cost of these items with the cost of the same
market basket in a selected base period. The weights
given to various expenditure categories in the mar-
ket basket are kept constant or fixed from period to
period. Currently, the CPI market basket is based on
a survey taken in the 1972-73 period. In the past
these weights have revised approximately every 10
years. The PCE deflator, on the other hand, is essen-
tially a variable or current-weight index. This index,
unlike the CPI, takes into account the prices of per-
sonal consumption items in the current period and, in
effect, weighs them by the quantities currently pur-
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chased, Since expenditure patterns can change, the
weights can vary from period to period.
Economists have recognized that both fixed- and
variable-weight indexes present problems. One prob-
1cm is that consumption patterns change over time
as people alter their preferences or respond to changes
in relative prices. For example, in the 1970s the
price of oil rose sharply relative to other prices. As
a result, consumers curtailed their consumption of
gasoline and other oil-based products and purchased
substitutes for these products. Yet, in calculating the
CPI, the 1972-73 consumption pattern for oil-based
products continues to be used. As a result, the CPI
overstates changes in the price level, On the other
hand, the PCE deflator, which uses the current ex-
penditures for oil-based products in its calculation,
understates the price level, since substitutions and
curtailed energy consumption lowered the living
standard of consumers.
While over past periods changing expenditure pat-
terns have been a rather insignificant problem, as
evidenced by the small difference between the CPI
and PCE deflator from 1947 to 1977, the problem has
been somewhat more pronounced in recent years. For
example, in 1979 it is estimated that about half of
the 2.9 percentage-point difference between the CPI
and the PCE deflator can be attributed to changing
weights or differences in weights on gasoline pur-
chases.° Also important was the approximately 1.8
percentage-point difference caused by the different
treatment of homeownership costs in the two indexes.
Homeownership Costs — Much recent criticism of
the CPI has focused on the measurement of housing
costs. Durable goods, such as houses, are consumed
over an extended period of time. Thus, the purchase
of a durable good represents an act of saving (future
consumption) with relatively minor effects on cur-
rent consumption.
The cost of owner-occupied housing, like other
items in the CPI, are calculated by using weights
derived by surveys in the early 1970s. In this period,
about 6 percent of households purchased homes. As
currently measured, the CPI assumes that 6 percent of
households will purchase and consume the total
value of the house and one-hall of the mortgage that
usually goes along with it in the current period, while
those living in previously purchased houses will
spend nothing for housing services except for mainte-
°Alan S. Blinder, “The Consumer Price Index and The Meas-
urement of Recent inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (2:1980), pp. 539-65.
nanee, taxes and insurance. Aside from numerous
technical problems, this view of housing costs gives
a misleading estimate of the cost to the “average”
consumerY~A sharp rise in mortgage interest rates,
for example, raises the cost of housing, though few
homeowners may actually bear the cost.
While there is no “right” way to measure housing
costs, economists generally accept a procedure called
the “rental equivalence” approach. This method in-
volves the sampling of rents from rented houses. If
homeowners charge rents that cover all the costs of
maintaining a home, then the price of a house, the
cost of credit, etc., are included in the rent charged by
the owner to the renter.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics, which computes
the CPI, has experimented with several methods to
calculate homeownership costs, including rental equiv-
alence.” A comparison of the experimental rental
equivalence series and the official CPI measure shows
considerable differences in recent years (table 3). In
1980, for example, the official CPI measure grew at a
12,5 percent annual rate compared with only a 10.8
percent increase in the experimental series.
Price Indexing and Real Wage Declines —
The Financial Implications
In essence, the price indexing of social security
payments is a promise by the government to keep
benefits unchanged in terms of their purchasing
power. As just seen, this may be hard to attain be-
cause of problems in measuring the price level. In
addition, the promise of fixed real benefits is some-
times inconsistent with the methods used to finance
social security benefits.
If Congress wants to maintain the purchasing power
of benefits received by current social security recip-
ients, it must levy an appropriate level of taxes to
pay for these benefits. Social security benefits are
currently funded on a pay-as-you-go basis; that is,
benefits for currently retired workers are funded by
payroll taxes on the wages and salaries of those cur-





As a proxy for rents on rented houses, this experimental
series uses the CPI rent index, which includes rents on apart—
mnents as well as rented houses.
‘
2
One-half of the payroll tax is levied directly on an employee’s
earnings and the other half is paid hy employers. Studies,
however, indicate that the portion of the tax paid by em-
ployers is, for the most part, borne by employees. For a
discussion of this point, see John A. Brittain, The Payroll
Tax for Social Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1975), Chapters I and ii,
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and salaries rise more slowly than the price level.
When this occurs, the benefits of current social security
recipients, which rise with increases in the price level,
increase more rapidly than revenues, which rise with
increases in wages and salaries.
Historically, wages have generally advanced more
rapidly than prices; that is, real wages have generally
risen (table 4). These increases reflect advances in
labor productivity (output per manhour worked). In
recent years, however, real wages have declined with
the decline in labor prodnctivity.’3 The adjusted hourly
earnings of workers,’4 after allowances for increases
in the CPI, have declined or remained unchanged in
five of the past eight years and, on average, have de-
clined at about a 1 percent annual rate since 1972.’~
The decline in real wages has contributed substan-
tially to the financing problem the social security sys-
tem now faces. Moreover, if this financing problem is
resolved by increasing payroll taxes rather than re-
ducing benefits, the price indexing of benefits will
further redistribute the ability to consume the nation’s
output from those working to those receiving social
security benefits. When nominal wages rise more
slowly than the price level, a tax increase imposes a
further decline in real wages. In effect, this decline
imposes an additional reduction in living standards
for workers in order to leave the purchasing power of
social security benefits unchanged.
JUNE iULY 1951
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Year mdcxl dollars dollar&:
1952-72 2.2% 4.5% 22%
1972 3.3 6.4 3.0
1973 6.2 6.2 0.0
1974 11.0 7.9 2.7
1975 9.1 8.3 0.7
1976 5.7 7.3 1.3
1977 6.5 7.5 1.0
1978 7.6 8.2 0.6
1979 11.3 7.9 3.1
1980 13.3 9.3 3.6
1972-80’ 6.8 7.8 0.9
1952_fbi 4.1 5.5 1.3
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workers than would otherwise have been necessary.’°
The CPI’s overstatement of the cost-of-living in-
crease in recent years magnifies the income transfer. Alternative Indexing Rules
This overstatement results in benefit increases above
those necessary to maintain the same level of real Modifying the indexing rules to tie benefits tonomi-
benefits, and implies an even greater increase in taxes nal wage movements rather than price index move-
and a further reduction in the real after-tax wages of ments appears to be a way to alleviate some of these
_______ problems. With benefits linked to nominal wage rates,
real benefits would change commensurately with real
13
Several explanations have been offered by economists for wages; that is, when nominal wages rise faster than
the recent decline in productivity and, hence, the decline
in real wages. One explanation points to the sharp rises in the the price level, indicating rising productivity and a
relative price of energy in 1973-74, and again in 1979- rising standard of living for workers, real social secu-
80. According to some studies, these sharp increases in the
relative price of energy made part of the capital stock -~~- rity benefits would also increase. Conversely, when
nomically obsolete, thereby reducing workers productivity, wages increase more slowly than the price level, mdi-
For details of this and other explanations, see John A. Tatom, ________
“The Productivity Problem, ‘ this Review (September 1979),
pp. 3-16.
~Average hourly earnings are reported before deductions for
taxes, social insurance, fringe benefits, etc. The adjusted
hourly earnings index takes into account such factors as
variation in the amounts of overtime pay or shifts of workers
into higher or lower paying industries.
‘
5
As discussed earlier in this paper, to the extent the CPI has
overstated the rate of price increases in recent years, this
decline in real wages is also overstated,
16
Another potential problem is the difference in expenditare
patterns of social security beneficiaries, and urban wage
earners and clerical workers. To the extent there are differ-
ences in expenditure patterns, relative price changes would
affect the purchasing power of social security benefits differ-
enfly than earnings of urban wage earners. A study by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, however, indicated that a con-
sumer price index based on purchasing patterns of retired
workers would not be substantially different from the official
CPI measure. See Janet L. Norwood, “Cost-of-Living Escala-
tion of Pensions,’ Monthly Labor Review (June 1972),
pp. 21-24.
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cating lower productivity and a declining standard of
living for workers, real benefits would decline.
Had social security benefits been indexed to aver-
age hourly earnings during the recent period of real
wage declines, much of the current short-term finan-
cial problem would have been averted. Benefits in-
dexedto adjusted average hourly earnings during 1979,
1980, and 1981 would have resulted in social security
benefit increases of 8.2 percent in June 1979, 8.4 per-
cent in June 1980 and 9.8 percent in June 1981, instead
of the respective 9.9, 14.3 and 11.2 percent increases
actually granted. In total, during these three years,
benefits of retired workers rose 35 percent as average
hourly earnings of current workers rose only 26
percent.
To initiate the indexing of social security benefits
to nominal wages at thrs point, however, would prob-
ably still increase future deficits in the OASI trust
fund. Since, historically, nominal wages have risen
faster than the price level, the continuation of this
trend would result in greater increases in benefits
than under a price-indexed scheme and hence greater
deficits in the OASI trust fund than those currently
projected.
A variant of a wage indexing scheme is the “mini-
mum-rule” scheme, which indexes benefits to the lower
increase of the wage or price index. This rule implies
that real social security benefits will decline when
real wages decline, but remain unchanged when real
wages rise.’7 This nile would largely remove the fi-
tT
One objection to this rule is that real wages often decline
and rise in business cycles. For instance, if real wages fell
in year one but recovered that loss in year two, under the
minimum rule real social security benefits would be re-
duced in the first year but kept at that same lower real
level in the second year. However, Congress could easily
monitor this kind of problem and remedy it by ad hoc in-
creases in benefits.
nancial problem that occnrs when real wages decline.
For example, if the minimum rule had been in effect
in the past three years so that benefits would have
increased with hourly earnings rather than the CPI,
the estimated year-end balance in fiscal year 1986
would be $3.7 billion in deficit rather than the CBO
estimates of $63.5 billion (see tables 1 and 5). Un-
fortunately, to introduce the minimum rule at this
point would not solve the financing problem of the
OASI trust fund, since this rule would not reduce
benefits from their present level.18 Thus, the minimum
rule will not cure the present budget problems, but
will prevent larger deficits in a future period of de-
clining real wages.
New measures will have to be taken to solve the
current short-term financing problem. The CBO for
example, has investigated a number of possible op-
tions, including a “partial’ indexing to the CPI. It
estimated that if benefits were increased by only two-
thirds of the actual increase in the CPI over the next
several years, the financing problem over this decade
would be eliminated.’0 Several other proposals have
also been suggested to eliminate the short-term financ-
ing problem. These include the reapportionment of
Table 5
Outlays. Income and Balances for the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Fund,
Assuming the Minimum Rule in Effect (billions of dollars)
1979 1950 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Outlays S 89.8 $100.3 $11~.7 5131.6 5149.0 $168.3 S1~9.6 $212.9
Income- 86.9 1 00.1 117.8 129.0 143.0 159.1 181.9 203.7
Year-end balance 28.1 27.9 31.0 23.4 22.4 13.2 5.5 3.7
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The CB0 has considered the effect of this rule on the im-
pending deficit of the OASI trust fund. According to their
estimates, the minimum rule would reduce outlays of the
trust fund over the next five years by ~26 billion, or cut
about 40 percent of the projected deficit over the next five
years. Their estimate, however, is based on the assumption
that the indexing rule goes into effect in 1981 when the
CBO projects the nominal wages to rise about 3 percent
slower than the official CPI measure. In fact, if this rule
were instigated at a later date when the CBO projects wage
increases to again exceed price increases, the minimum rule
would do nothing to eliminate the short-run financing prob-
lem of the OASI trust fund. See Paying for Social Security:
Funding Options for the Near Term, (Congressional Budget
Office of the Congress of the United States, February 1981).
‘°Ibid.pp. 29-31.
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funds in other social security trust funds into the
OASI trust fund, the taxation of social security bene-
fits and the reduction or elimination of certain bene-
fits. The administration recently has proposed a plan
that would cut back the benefits of future early re-
tiring workers, while only marginally reducing the
benefits of current recipients. While these various
proposals would eliminate, to varying degrees, the
estimated deficit over the next several years, they
would not remove the basic inconsistency between
price indexing and the pay-as-you-go financing of the
social security benefits. In other words, none of these
proposals would preclude additional deficits from de-
veloping in the OASI trust fund should future declines
in real wages occur.
INDEXDG AND THE LONG-TERM
FINANCIAL IMBALANCE
Analysts also project a long-term financial imbal-
ance in the social security trust funds for the next
century, when outlays again are projected to exceed
inflows into the social security system. One of the
major factors underlying this imbalance is the in-
creasing ratio of retirees to workers.
Since benefits are now funded on a pay-as-you-go
basis, the benefits of current workers will be funded
by payroll taxes paid by the next generation of work-
ers. This funding scheme is subject to changes in
demographic patterns. Past increases in benefits were
granted on the assumption that birth rates would be
higher than current projections now indicate. With
declining birth rates, there will be fewer workers to
pay into the social security trust funds when the post-
World War II baby-boom generation begins to retire.
In addition, the increased life expectancy has in-
creased the ratio of retirees to workers.
This problem is potentially quite serious, despite the
substantial increases in social security taxes that have
already been scheduled as a result of the 1977 amend-
ments to the Social Security Act (see table 6). If the
current law is left intact until 2025, taxes on payrolls
would have to rise, according to estimates of the chief
actuary of the social security system, by at least 8
percentage points in order to fund benefits at that
point, implying nearly a 24 percent tax on taxabte
payrolls.20 To compensate for these scheduled in-
20A. Haeworth Robertson, “Financial Status of Social Security
Program After the Social Security Amendments of 1977,”
Social Security Bulletin (March 1978), pp. 21-30. The 24
percent rate includes the tax on both the employer and the
employee,
Table 6
Social Security Taxes on Payrolls Before
and After the 1977 Amendments
Ta rates (percent)’ Taxable base
Before After Before After
1977 585% 585% $16500 $16500
1978 6.05 605 17700 17700
1979 605 6.13 18.900 22900
1980 6.05 6.13 20400 25900
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creases in soc’al secuiitv taxes, alternatives to ieduce
benefits have been suggested. One proposal is to in-
crease the retirement age from 65 to 68, thereby reduc-
ing the average period that benefits are paid out;
another is to tax social security benefits, which would
generate additional general revenues that couldthen be
used to fund social security benefits.2’
The modification of current indexing procedures is
another alternative. Under current law, the benefits
of retired workers increase with the price level, but
the benefits of future retirees are tied to average wage
movements.22 Wage indexing is essentially a promise
‘
1
An argument for the taxation of social security benefits can
also be made on the basis of equity considerations. Taxation
of social benefits, or some portion of benefits, would treat
such income more equally with that of other pension in—
comes. Also, it would tax social security income according to
the ability—to-pay criteria applied to other inconmc.
1
2
Benefits of future retirees are indexed in two ways. First, the
wage history of retiring workers is indexed to the average
wages of U.S. workers so that earnings in past years are
brought up to current average wage levels. For example, if
the average earnings doubled from 1970 to 1980, the wage
that a retiring worker actually earned in 1970, say, $10,000,
would be doubled to 820,000. After a certain number of years
are dropped out, the worker’s indexed earning history is
aveniged to obtain the average indexed monthly eamings
(AIME). A formula to cooipute benefits, prescribed by Con-
gress, is then applied which in 1979 was 90 percent of the
first $180 plus 32 percent of the next $905 plus 15 percent
of the excess over 81,085. This formula is indexed to average
U.S. wage movements. The “breakpoints,” namely $180 and
$1,085, are adjusted automatically- each year to reflect changes
in average U.S. wages.
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to keep the benefits of retiring workers at a certain
proportion of their real income during their lifetime.
Thus, as discussed earlier, when wages rise faster than
prices, the initial benefits of future retiring workers
will increase in real terms in step with increases in
wages over their working years.
This procedure itseff is consistent with the current
financing scheme that taxes payroll income, in the
sense that future benefits and taxes will rise or fall
together. However, large benefit increases were
granted in the late 1960s and early 1970s based on
what now appears to have been incorrect assumptions
about birth and death rates. As a result, a long-term
financing problem is expected to emerge if current
demographic trends persist.
An indexing procedure that would insure that bene-
fits grow at a lower rate than revenue is a “partially-
indexed” wage rule. This rule would specify that
benefits be indexed to wage movements, but by a
smaller percentage than the wage increase. When
real wages are growing, benefits would rise over timp,
but not as rapidly as wages or revenues. While the
purchasing power of promised benefits to future re-
tirees would be reduced from where they are now,
they would normally be at a substantially higher level
than those of current retirees.
CONCLUSION
Congress has indexed social security benefits to
movements in the consumer price index, a reform in-
tended to protect the purchasing power of these bene-
fits. Recent U.S. experience, however, has shown that
there are problems with this procedure. One problem
is that the CPI has seriously overstated the rise in
prices in recent years; thus, it has contributed to
higher benefits than were necessary to keep the pur-
chasing power of benefits unchanged. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics is currently contemplating certain
technical changes in the official CPI calculations, such
as the measurement of home ownership costs by the
rental equivalence method. These changes, if imple-
mented, may result in a better measure of changes in
the price level.
In addition, price indexing of benefits can be in-
consistent with the method currently used to finance
the social security system. The system is essentially
financed on a pay-as-you-go basis by taxes on wages
and salaries, so when prices rise faster than wages,
benefits rise faster than revenues into the OASI trust
fund, To remedy such a situation, once the small
trust fund balances are depleted, requires that the
government either levy additional taxes on workers
or reduce the growth of benefits.
One reform of the indexing procedure that would
greatly diminish the likelihood of such financial im-
balances in the OASI trust fund in a future period
of declining real wages is the so-called minimum
rule. This rule would limit benefit increases to either
average wage movements or the price level, whichever
is smaller, and implies that benefits would decline in
real terms when real wages of workers decline and
remain constant when real wages rise, as the current
law provides. Such a rule does not reduce benefits
from those promised under current law except when
real wages of workers are declining. Thus, at this
point, it would neither solve the short-term financing
problem faced in the 1980s nor the long-term problem
that is expected to develop in the next century. It
would, however, preclude them from becoming worse
should prices rise faster than wages in the future. To
solve these financing problems, other measures must
be taken to either increase taxes or reduce benefits.
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